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WORKING PAPER #20
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE:
CANADIAN OBJECTIVES

by Douglas Hamlin
January 1990



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For more copies, please write:

360 Albert, Suite 900
Ottawa, Ontario
K1R 7X7

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PREFACE

Douglas Hamlin is a former director of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Department of External Affairs. This paper is based on research conducted by the author in his capacity as Senior Fellow at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. The views contained in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

In the last quarter of 1989 political change of unimaginable dimensions swept across Eastern Europe and altered the entire East-West security environment. NATO and the Warsaw Pact continued, but as one hard-line Communist régime after another toppled, there was increasing talk about such issues as a New Atlanticism, new architectures for European unity, and German reunification. Politics and popular aspirations were in the driving seat, pushing events along and setting the agenda.

At the same time, remarkable developments were underway in the field of arms control. By Autumn 1989, it had become clear that the NATO and Warsaw Pact states, meeting in Vienna, were rapidly heading towards the greatest force reductions agreement in history. The delegations assembled in the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) had already set out similar positions on most of the fundamental issues, and were expected, in the absence of some cataclysm, to reach agreement on a complete, initial accord by the Summer or Autumn of 1990.

These negotiations address a confrontation which has been at the centre of East-West rivalry for the last forty years. They deal with an issue involving well over fifty per cent of the whole world's military expenditures. If they are successful, they are expected to lead, in phase one, to reductions of tens of thousands of main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery pieces, as well as tactical aircraft, other military equipment, and manpower. And afterwards there may be other rounds of negotiations leading to further cuts, as well as efforts to shift the whole thrust of the European security effort from confrontation to the pursuit of mutual reassurance.

Consequently, the more that is known about the CFE negotiations and about what lies behind them the better. It is essential to look at their antecedents, to understand the preoccupations of the various participants, and to examine the key factors affecting the approaches of East and West. Even now, when political conditions are changing so rapidly, it is important to recognize that the CFE talks are still negotiations among members of two alliances, whose approaches to this issue have not altered fundamentally since bargaining started early in 1989.

Doug Hamlin's paper makes a valuable contribution to understanding the field. It sets out the issue of conventional force reductions in Europe as seen by a Canadian diplomat with long involvement in arms control. In a very careful and balanced fashion, he outlines the key factors governing the West's policies, and indicates how they evolved over time especially during the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations. Mr. Hamlin focuses on the problems of surprise attack and geostrategic disparities between the two alliances, and then sets out Western thinking on such questions as verification and the long-term future of security in Europe. Canada's particular interests in this field are mentioned, and the paper concludes with an outline of the objectives that this country ought to pursue in the new, CFE negotiations.

This paper was completed before the onset of massive political change in Eastern Europe. We decided to publish it as it stands -- with the expectation that the reader will mentally update a few sections -- rather than embark on a major rewriting process. We believe that, despite the changes in the environment, Doug Hamlin's paper will be seen as a very useful outline of official Western thinking on the CFE question, that is helpful to the interested public as well as students of the conventional forces issues.

Roger Hill
Director of Research
January 1990

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe has been and is a priority of Canadian arms control and disarmament policy. This paper addresses Canadian objectives through a survey of major factors influencing policies. These factors illustrate the complexity and importance of the subject. During the period from planning for the MBFR talks on conventional force reductions in Central Europe to planning for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), two factors have remained constant: concern about surprise attack, and the disparity in the geostrategic positions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

There are a number of other similarities: the possibility of conflict by accident or miscalculation, the concept of stability, the question of long-term European security, the level of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and the level of US forces in Western Europe. Other factors have changed during the past twenty years. These include: the international politico-military situation, the level of confidence, acceptability of on-site inspection, Soviet military doctrine, attitudes towards modernization of armaments, unilateral Soviet reductions, and public opinion.

Eight key objectives for conventional arms control are identified as a result of the present analysis:

- to reduce military confrontation;
- to maintain and enhance stability at lower levels of forces;
- to eliminate the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action;
- to ensure that treaties on conventional forces in Europe contribute to the achievement of long-term European security;
- to assist, through the talks on conventional forces, in the management of East-West relations;

- to ensure that the security of each participant is not affected adversely at any stage;
- to contribute to the development of an effective verification regime;
- to build upon areas of agreement and other experience in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks.

The conclusion also touches on the relevance of the economic objective of reducing military expenditure and on the importance of presenting arms control policies effectively to the Canadian public in the period ahead.

CONDENSÉ

La limitation des armes conventionnelles et le désarmement en Europe ont été et continuent d'être deux volets prépondérants de la politique du Canada en matière de désarmement et de limitation des armements. Le présent document examine les objectifs de notre pays, par le biais d'une analyse des grands facteurs influant sur les politiques. Ces derniers traduisent la complexité et l'importance du sujet. Au cours de la période qui s'est écoulée entre le moment où l'on a préparé les pourparlers sur la réduction des forces classiques en Europe centrale (MBFR) et celui où l'on a planifié les négociations sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe (FCE), deux facteurs sont demeurés constants : la crainte d'une attaque surprise, et le contraste entre les positions géostratégiques de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie.

Par ailleurs, un certain nombre d'autres aspects sont demeurés plus ou moins les mêmes : les risques d'erreurs de calcul ou de conflits déclenchés par accident, le concept de la stabilité, la question de la sécurité de l'Europe à long terme, l'importance numérique des forces soviétiques en Europe de l'Est, et le niveau des forces américaines en Europe occidentale. En revanche, certains facteurs ont changé au cours des vingt dernières années. Citons notamment la conjoncture politico-militaire internationale; le degré de confiance; l'acceptabilité des inspections in situ; la doctrine militaire soviétique; les attitudes face à la modernisation des armements; les réductions unilatérales opérées par l'URSS, et l'opinion publique.

La présente analyse permet de définir huit objectifs clefs relativement à la limitation des armes conventionnelles :

- o réduire l'intensité de l'affrontement militaire;
- o préserver et renforcer la stabilité à des niveaux inférieurs d'effectifs;
- o éliminer la capacité de déclencher une attaque surprise ou une offensive d'envergure;
- o garantir que les traités sur les forces classiques en Europe contribuent à l'instauration d'une sécurité durable dans cette partie du monde;

- o favoriser, grâce aux pourparlers sur les forces conventionnelles, la gestion des relations Est-Ouest;
- o s'assurer que la sécurité de chaque participant est entièrement garantie à tous les stades du processus;
- o contribuer à la mise en oeuvre d'un régime efficace de vérification;
- o profiter de ce qui a été acquis à la faveur des pourparlers sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces (MBFR).

Dans la conclusion, l'auteur s'interroge aussi sur l'à-propos de l'objectif économique consistant à réduire les dépenses militaires et sur l'importance qu'il y a à bien présenter les politiques de limitation des armements au public canadien au cours des années à venir.

INTRODUCTION

The Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, aimed at reducing and limiting arms and manpower, opened on 9 March 1989. Simultaneously a second stage of talks on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) began. These two distinct negotiations are taking place in Vienna. The first is within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but involving only the sixteen members of NATO and the seven members of the Warsaw Pact. The second forms an integral part of the CSCE process, involving all thirty-five members of the CSCE, as was the case with the first stage of these talks in Stockholm. Both negotiations are dealing with Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Widening the area of application from Central Europe to the whole of Europe is a major change over the past twenty years. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, held during the past fifteen years and focused on Central Europe, ended on 2 February 1989. But the way for talks on reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals had been paved in the Stockholm talks from 1984 to 1986 on CSBMs applicable to the whole of Europe. Canada was an active participant in those two negotiations.

Canadian objectives at these new talks can be examined through a survey of major factors which have influenced those objectives. Two, which have been constant, are treated in some detail. Others, which have changed to varying degrees during the past twenty years are treated more briefly. Primary sources are Canadian statements, NATO communiqués and other documents to which Canada has agreed. The primary focus is on talks on limiting and reducing the military confrontation in conventional forces. The paper argues that current objectives are those which have existed since the days of planning for MBFR. Articulated in more detail today, these objectives remain valid: The present environment, which is significantly different from that of the late sixties and early seventies, holds greater opportunities for realizing these goals.

The predominant aim in entering negotiations on conventional forces -- as has been true of other arms control and disarmament negotiations since World War II -- is to contribute to international security. The economic incentive of reducing military expenditures is to release resources for other purposes. This has become more important

in recent years with the steadily increasing cost of deploying and maintaining conventional forces.¹

Certain conditions favour the successful conclusion of arms control and disarmament negotiations, such as a desire for agreement by the countries involved in the negotiation and the existence of a measure of confidence.² Recent statements by NATO and the Warsaw Pact leave little doubt that, for members of both alliances, there is a political need to reduce the military confrontation in Europe and enhance stability through negotiation. A measure of confidence does exist, aided by experience in implementing the Stockholm Document on CSBMs. There remains disagreement on the extent of disparities. However, the necessity of asymmetrical reductions, a major preoccupation of NATO countries, has been acknowledged by the Soviet Union. Prospects for concluding a treaty are therefore better than they were at the beginning of MBFR.

A number of other assumptions about East-West security relations are made in the present study:

- mutual distrust can decline only gradually over a long period of time;
- NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to exist for the foreseeable future;³
- the NATO strategy of flexible response may well evolve, as it has done in the past, but deterrence will continue to rest on a mix of conventional and nuclear forces;
- future negotiations on US and Soviet nuclear forces will be bilateral;

¹ For example, the severe economic problems of the Soviet Union have forced it to announce reductions in military expenditure. In addition, the large trade deficit and foreign debt of the United States have led it to become increasingly vocal on the need for burden-sharing among members of NATO.

² For a theoretical analysis of conditions and objectives see Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, New York, Praeger, 1965, Part I, especially chapters 1 and 3.

³ In 1985 the Warsaw Treaty was renewed for another thirty years. The North Atlantic Treaty is of indefinite duration.

- Europe will remain Canada's first line of defence. Canada will therefore continue to have a major interest in the multilateral negotiations which can lead to a broad security regime for Europe.

The analysis begins with a look at Canadian policy.

CANADIAN POLICY

Conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe has been a priority of Canadian policy throughout the 1980s. In recent years, the formulation has been "the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of conventional military forces in Europe and elsewhere."⁴ Some years ago, it was: "we will participate actively in negotiations to limit and reduce conventional forces".⁵ The subject received priority in the 1970s particularly in the period leading up to the beginning of MBFR. The 1970 White Paper on foreign policy stated that Canada would seek "to promote realistic proposals for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe."⁶ Much earlier, the reduction of conventional forces figured in five "guiding principles" of Canadian policy set out at the UN Disarmament Commission in July 1956.⁷

Thirty years ago, deliberations by UN bodies were about arms control and disarmament as a whole. Canada and other countries considered nuclear and conventional forces together. It was later acknowledged that negotiations on the two types of weaponry could best be pursued separately. However, Canada has consistently recognized the

⁴ The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, "Notes for an Address before the North Atlantic Assembly," Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, 23 May 1987, p. 4.

⁵ The Honourable Mark MacGuigan, "A Security Imperative for the Eighties," Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches no. 80/16, Ottawa, 13 June 1980, p. 4.

⁶ Foreign Policy for Canadians, Europe, Ottawa, 1970, p. 25.

⁷ Cited in Grant R. Davy, Canada's Role in the Disarmament Negotiations 1946-57. Thesis presented at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Boston, 15 April 1962, pp. 368-369.

relationship between conventional and nuclear negotiations. When MBFR began, it was viewed as part of a process which included SALT.⁸

The goal of limiting and reducing conventional forces brings together defence with arms control and disarmament -- two complementary instruments of international security policy. Ultimately, there is a political purpose for stationing Canadian forces in Europe.⁹ This was so in the early 1970s, when Canada reduced its forces in Europe; it has been so in recent years as Canada took steps to increase its commitment to the defence of Europe. Canadian political interests are served actively participating in negotiations on the future of European security in the CSCE and in Europe and in conventional arms control talks. Those interests include influencing East-West relations and participating in the dialogue between the European and the American states within NATO.

Negotiations on conventional forces in Europe are different from many multilateral negotiations in which Canada has been involved. They are not about reducing or prohibiting a weapons system, as is the case, for example, with chemical weapons. They are concerned with preserving and enhancing stability at lower levels of forces. Moreover, they are part of a political process of change in East-West relations. Canada saw MBFR as a separate but "parallel" negotiation to the CSCE talks in the 1970s.¹⁰ Canada has consistently sought to combine two approaches to negotiations on conventional forces in Europe: to lessen military confrontation through reductions; and to pursue talks as an important aspect of the management of East-West relations.

⁸ Statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 4 July 1973.

⁹ For a recent view, see The Post-INF Situation: Canada's Position on Arms Control and the Security of the Atlantic Alliance, ORAE Extra Mural Paper No. 50, Ottawa, July 1988, pp. 60-65.

¹⁰ Standing Committee in External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 11, Ottawa, 15 May 1973, p. 38 and Issue No. 19, 19 June 1973, p. 7.

Throughout the MBFR talks, Canada favoured the close coordination of NATO negotiation positions. For the new negotiations, coordination has been somewhat looser.¹¹ Nevertheless, NATO members achieved consensus on a series of significant statements during the planning period.¹²

Canada has favoured a step-by-step approach towards the management of East-West relations. At the exploratory talks on MBFR, Canada argued for "a gradual, systematic approach."¹³ In practical terms, that meant an initial effort to reach an agreement on reductions in manpower levels of US and Soviet forces in Central Europe. Canada now supports reductions in certain armaments but, as was the case in MBFR, in "a negotiating process which proceeds step-by-step and which guarantees the undiminished security of all concerned at each stage,"¹⁴ -- a point which is embodied in the agreed mandate.

From a very early stage in post-World War II deliberations on arms control and disarmament, Canadian policy has always emphasized that agreements should be adequately verifiable. Canada has stressed the importance of including provisions to ensure that states comply with the terms of an agreement. One of the guiding principles laid down in 1956 was that negotiations should continue on those aspects which were considered to be "controllable" -- i.e., verifiable -- such as the reduction of troops and conventional armaments. Another principle was that verification proposals, such as Open Skies and ground control posts, should be part of the early stage of a comprehensive disarmament programme.¹⁵

¹¹ Planning took place in the High Level Task Force established at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Halifax in May 1986.

¹² "Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control," 11 December 1986; "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988; and the statement issued at the Ministerial Meeting, 8 December 1988.

¹³ Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No.49, Ottawa, 15 May 1973.

¹⁴ Brussels Declaration, paragraph 8.

¹⁵ See Footnote 7 above.

When the MBFR talks began, Canada stated that an agreement should have provisions designed "to avoid the risk of their possible violation."¹⁶ This was the intent of some of the "associated measures", the term used in the official title of the talks. Canada also referred to them as stabilizing measures.¹⁷ Such measures are likely to be featured strongly in the new negotiations.¹⁸ An "effective verification regime" has been highlighted as an important objective.¹⁹ Canada can help achieve this objective through the Verification Research Programme it launched some years ago.²⁰

Canadian arms control and disarmament policy has been buttressed by strong domestic support. Negotiations on conventional forces have so far taken second place to deliberations and negotiations on nuclear arms in the public view. With Canada's geographic position between the USSR and US, the two major nuclear weapon states, public concern about strategic nuclear weapons is hardly surprising. Moreover, both the US and USSR have been concentrating on bilateral negotiations on nuclear forces.

Though public comment on negotiations on conventional forces has been more muted, support for NATO has remained high throughout the period during which NATO increasingly devoted attention to arms control and disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. Over the years there has been a growing public awareness of the complexities of the issues. Canadian policy, particularly in the past ten years, has encompassed the need to provide information to the public on these issues. A major challenge in the period ahead will be to explain, not only the complexities involved in negotiations on conventional forces, but also the need for the modernization of forces. In addition, the public should be made aware of the continuing interrelationship between the nuclear and conventional balance of forces. All of these bear on the overriding

¹⁶ George K. Grande, "Statement by the Head of the Canadian Delegation," Vienna, 30 October 1973.

¹⁷ W. H. Barton, "Reducing the Credibility of War as a Tool of Government," Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 73/27, Ottawa, 24 October 1973, p. 7.

¹⁸ Statement issued at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, 8 December 1988, paragraph 6.

¹⁹ Brussels Declaration, paragraph 8.

²⁰ Under the Programme, the project known as PAXSAT B is directly related to verifying of compliance with a conventional forces agreement.

objective of the prevention of war and "the enhancement of international stability and security at the lowest possible level of armaments."²¹ The new negotiations on conventional forces in Europe are likely to be much more at centre stage than were the MBFR talks. Public support, in Canada and other NATO countries, may well be a key factor as negotiations proceed.

TWO CONSTANTS

The possibility of surprise attack by the Soviet Union has influenced objectives on conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe more than any other concern. The second and closely related concern is the disparity in the geostrategic positions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Surprise Attack

The possibility of war breaking out in Europe through surprise attack was a major preoccupation in the 1950s. Concern grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Reducing that possibility was a major objective at the Stockholm CSBM negotiations. It has been identified as a primary objective for new negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. For the past thirty years, it has remained a "constant in Canadian thinking about arms control in Europe."²²

In deliberations on comprehensive disarmament at the United Nations in the mid-1950s, there were frequent attempts to come to grips with the fear of a surprise attack using nuclear weapons. Even then though, it was widely assumed that an initial conventional attack was more likely.²³

²¹ The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Standing Committee on National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 10, Ottawa, 28 April 1987, p. 6.

²² Michael Tucker, "Reducing the Level of Fear," Peace & Security, Vol. 2. No. 2, Summer 1987, p. 7.

²³ Up to the 1970s it was argued that the Soviet Union might begin a war using nuclear strikes.

Verification measures to provide early warning against surprise attack included the US Open Skies proposal at the Geneva Summit in 1955. In the UN Disarmament Subcommittee that year, the Soviet Union agreed that an international verification organization should establish control posts at railway junctions, airports, and other places, in order to observe any dangerous concentration of forces. Canada supported both these proposals. In a separate initiative Canada "urged its allies to take a serious look at the possibility of an East-West agreement on the reciprocal establishment of ground observation posts".²⁴ Unfortunately, the Soviet position on ground control posts at the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference was unacceptable because it would have amounted to little more than self-inspection.

Canada was one of five NATO countries to attend the abortive 1958 Surprise Attack Conference in Geneva.²⁵ Proposed by the United States, "the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack" met for six weeks and adjourned without reaching agreement on its agenda. While its full title contained the ambitious objective of preventing surprise attack, documents tabled by the West referred to the more modest but realistic objective of reducing the danger of surprise attack.

One Western document defined one type of surprise attack as "the unexpected assault by ground forces of one state or group of states on another state or group of states in overwhelming strength." It listed the "instruments of surprise attack" as short-range, surface-to-surface missiles with mobile launchers, troop-carrier aircraft, armoured fighting vehicles and mobile artillery. The document proposed a system for "observation and inspection" of ground forces. It concluded that a "significant reduction of the danger of surprise attack by ground forces is practicable and technically feasible through the use of an adequate number of observer teams with properly defined rights, with

²⁴ Tucker, Peace&Security, Summer 1987, p. 7.

²⁵ In addition to Canada, Western participants were the USA, the UK, France and Italy. Eastern countries at the conference were the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Albania.

proper technical, vehicular and communication equipment and with unimpeded access to and over areas in which ground forces are located".²⁶

Significantly, the document referred to both the "intention" and the "ability" to attack. Now the terms used are "risk" and "capability". These and other ideas explored at the 1958 conference resurfaced in the MBFR talks on associated measures. In some cases they are also being applied to the implementation of the Stockholm Document.

The 1958 Conference failed. The Soviet Union wanted to consider preventive measures only in the context of reductions in forces. Western countries wanted to agree on these preventive measures separately from the question of reductions. In effect, this was achieved nearly thirty years later with the signing of the Stockholm Document. The application of complementary measures to reductions and limitations of forces will be among the tasks of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The NATO strategy of forward defence puts a premium on adequate warning time. Because of this, concern about surprise attack continued throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. However, less was said about it. Partly, the view in the mid-1960s was that a rough balance of forces existed in Europe. In addition, in the late 1960s, NATO adopted its policy of flexible response. Deterrence would be made more credible, NATO members believed, by relying on conventional forces, but holding out the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons.

There were other reasons why less attention was paid to the danger of surprise attack. This period, the focus was on nuclear arms control. During planning for MBFR, there was also a perception of détente in East-West relations. A security conference on Europe was called for by the Soviet Union. However, the West insisted on negotiations for the purpose of reducing the military confrontation in Central Europe and thereby enhancing security in Europe. NATO drew attention to the need for measures on notification, observation and inspection to accompany or follow an MBFR agreement.²⁷ However, there was no explicit reference to surprise attack in the NATO declarations on MBFR at Reykjavik in 1968 and at Rome in 1970.

²⁶ Conference Document GEN/SA/10, 5 December 1958.

²⁷ Declaration of the North Atlantic Council, 4-5 December 1969, paragraph 7.

Nevertheless, the initial Western proposal at the MBFR talks in Vienna included the withdrawal of a Soviet tank army, and thus a reduction of one of the main instruments of surprise attack. Moreover, equal ceilings on manpower would, the West assumed, mean a reduced possibility of surprise attack. Also, the negotiation of associated measures was, in the Western view, a way to overcome Soviet secrecy and thereby further reduce the risks.

Canada referred to the subject at the outset of the CSCE process in 1973. With reference to the preparation of proposals for confidence-building measures (in which the Canadian delegation was to play a key role) the Secretary of State for External Affairs said: "The least the world can expect of us is that, in our search for greater security, we define measures to enhance confidence and to lessen the risk of military surprise..."²⁸

By the late 1970s, NATO was faced with a "new short-warning attack threat". Dramatic increases in and modernization of Soviet conventional armaments, especially those useful for surprise attack, were combined with new developments in Soviet military doctrine. "The growing emphasis of Soviet force structure and doctrine on conventional operations using highly ready, forward-deployed shock forces, designed to strike before NATO defences are in place, presents a different military problem to that perceived by the West when the Vienna talks got under way."²⁹ In his Alastair Buchan memorial lecture in 1977, Helmut Schmidt listed as one of seven objectives of MBFR the elimination of the threat of a surprise attack.³⁰ The following year it was suggested that neither side be allowed to maintain or develop the ability to launch a surprise attack. Under such an agreement, both sides would depend more on reinforcements. In addition, the mobility of frontline forces would be reduced. Each side would accept aerial and other types of reconnaissance within a defined zone.³¹

²⁸ Statement to the CSCE, Helsinki, 4 July 1973.

²⁹ Richard Burt, "Implications for Arms Control," in New Conventional Weapons and East-West Security Part II, Adelphi Papers 145, IISS, London, p. 24.

³⁰ Reproduced in Survival, January/February 1978, p. 5.

³¹ Christoph Bertram, The Future of Arms Control: Part II, Adelphi Papers 146, IISS, London, 1978, p. 20.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, East-West relations were in decline. One result was that the risk of surprise attack became even more pressing. Though not mentioned specifically in the Madrid mandate for the Stockholm Conference on CSBMs, reducing the risk of surprise attack was a key Western objective when the talks began early in 1984. The opening Canadian statement called on the Conference to "take into account all of the factors which are present in the current imbalance of conventional arms and which could lead to surprise attack ..."³² Some of the measures outlined in the Stockholm Document, and implemented since the beginning of 1987, go some considerable way to reducing the risk of surprise attack.³³ Examples of these measures include notification and observation of certain military activities and verification through on-site inspection. Strengthening the CSBM regime in the second stage of these talks can contribute further to the realization of this objective, particularly if an agreement can be reached on the regular exchange of information on the structure and deployment of forces and on verification of the information.³⁴

The CSBM regime may also facilitate attempts to reduce the capability for surprise attack. NATO countries have identified this as one of the objectives of the new negotiations on conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe.³⁵ The NATO statement in December 1988 was more specific. "Stationed forces, particularly those in active combat units, are especially relevant to surprise attack. We shall propose limits on such forces."³⁶

³² The Honourable Allen J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Notes for a Statement to the CCSBMDE", Stockholm, 18 January 1984, pp. 2-3.

³³ Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, External Affairs Canada, Canadian Foreign Policy Series, Ottawa, 19 September 1986.

³⁴ Having failed to reach agreement at Stockholm on exchange of information, the members of NATO have indicated that in the second stage they will propose "a wide-ranging comprehensive annual exchange of information concerning military organization, manpower, and equipment as well as major weapon deployment programmes." See Statement issued at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, 8 December 1988, paragraph 9.

³⁵ Brussels Declaration, paragraph 8.

³⁶ Statement at NATO Ministerial meeting, 8 December 1988, paragraph 5.

Throughout the planning period for the new negotiations, Canada drew attention to surprise attack as an important factor. The Defence White Paper suggested that negotiations should focus on establishing a more stable balance of forces "to reduce the likelihood of war occurring as a result of miscalculation or surprise attack."³⁷ The continuing thrust of Soviet actions, however was contrary to their declaratory policy. Canadian perceptions of Soviet actions were spelled out in testimony during parliamentary hearings: "Soviet doctrine, training and field exercises, as well as their equipment indicates their intention in the event of war to utilize deception and surprise to achieve their aims."³⁸

The mandate for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), agreed among the members of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact, includes as an objective "the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack."³⁹ For the first time in negotiations on conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe the capability for surprise attack has been identified by both sides as a priority problem to be resolved through reductions in armaments. For NATO countries the requirement is "the elimination from Europe of tens of thousands of Warsaw Pact weapons relevant to surprise attack, among them tanks and artillery pieces."⁴⁰

Geostrategic Positions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact

NATO's geography, with two members on one side of the Atlantic and fourteen on the other, occupying a relatively narrow strip of land in mainland Europe, creates problems and special requirements both for defence and for arms control and disarmament. The situation is compounded by the Warsaw Pact being a contiguous grouping of

³⁷ Challenge and Commitment, Ottawa, 1987, p. 27.

³⁸ Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, Issue No. 14, Ottawa, 9 February 1988, p. 7.

³⁹ The text of the mandate is included as an appendix to this paper. It has been characterized as providing more clearly stated objectives and guidelines than have been available at the beginning of other arms control negotiations. See The Honourable Mary Collins, "Speech to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers to mark the Opening of New Negotiations on Conventional Arms Control in Europe," Department of External Affairs, Statement 89/09, 7 March 1989.

⁴⁰ "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988, paragraph 15.

states with short lines of communication. The two main aspects of this geographical disparity are distance and infrastructure.

Unlike some other asymmetries between East and West, this one cannot itself be changed or modified through negotiation. The short distance from Soviet territory to the Central Front will remain as will the lack of strategic depth in Western Europe and the long distance between North America and Western Europe. The geographical factor does, however, influence the kind of measures which can be negotiated. Indeed it acts as a constraint on the formulation of Western arms control and disarmament proposals because the geostrategic advantage of the Warsaw Pact plays such an important role in command and control, reinforcement and supply. It is also an important reason for the Western countries' insistence on so far excluding naval forces from negotiations.

Reinforcement is a major aspect of the problem.⁴¹ The Soviet Union could reinforce its forces on the Central Front comparatively quickly by railroad; US and Canadian reinforcements would have to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Were a treaty to provide for reductions in forces in Central Europe involving withdrawal and/or dismantling of units and armaments, timely reinforcement in a crisis becomes an even more important part of the security equation. Also affected is the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces. Western vulnerability at the conventional level as a result of the ability of the East to reinforce its forces more rapidly could lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold.

The geostrategic problem was particularly acute in the case of the MBFR talks. The limited area under negotiation⁴² meant that Soviet forces withdrawn under an agreement would have been required to move no more than a few hundred kilometres to the Soviet Union, whereas US forces would have had to move several thousand kilometres to the United States.⁴³ The geographical area covered in the new negotiations, which

⁴¹ See Roger Hill, Are Major Conventional Force Reductions in Europe Possible?, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Aurora Papers 7, Ottawa, 1988.

⁴² Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg in the West; German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the East.

⁴³ The problem would have been exacerbated under the Soviet proposal that reductions of armaments of countries in the area under negotiation be effected by destruction.

includes Soviet territory west of the Ural Mountains, means that Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe would have to be withdrawn to the Urals. The geographical problem is thereby modified but not resolved.

During planning for the MBFR talks there was little explicit reference to the geographical factor. Western insistence on asymmetrical reductions was related to the problem of geographical disparity, but the objective of equal ceilings meant that there would ultimately be no compensation for the West's geographical disadvantage.⁴⁴

Recognition of the geographical factor can therefore be found mainly in references to reductions being "balanced" in "scope and timing". The 1970 Rome Declaration was more specific in stating that reductions "should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side having regard for the differences arising from geographical and other considerations."⁴⁵

By contrast, pronouncements in the period leading up to the new negotiations have highlighted the geostrategic asymmetry. The Brussels Declaration underlined the importance of "considerations of geography."⁴⁶ This was spelled out at the NATO Summit in 1988:

"The countries of the Warsaw Pact form a contiguous land mass; those of the Alliance are geographically disconnected;

The Warsaw Pact can generate a massive reinforcement potential from distances of only a few hundred kilometres; many Allied reinforcements need to cross the Atlantic."⁴⁷

⁴⁴ See Ernest F. Jung, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe in Light of the MBFR Experience," *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1988, 156-157.

⁴⁵ Declaration on MBFR at NATO Ministerial Meeting, Rome, May 1970, paragraph 3.

⁴⁶ Brussels Declaration, paragraph 6.

⁴⁷ "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988, paragraph 1.

The modernization of Soviet conventional forces in the 1970s aggravated the geostrategic asymmetry.⁴⁸ The increased firepower and mobility made NATO forces more dependent on reinforcements in time of crisis. Because of the geographical factor NATO statements have identified the capability for the initiation of large-scale offensive action as the major threat to stability.⁴⁹ Thus, at the NATO Summit in March 1988, the geographical factor had a strong impact on Western objectives:

"We shall propose provisions dealing with stationed forces, taking account of the weight of forward deployed Soviet conventional forces; we shall also take into consideration capabilities for force generation and reinforcement."⁵⁰

It seems therefore that an important element in a new treaty should be stabilizing measures designed to control and constrain mobilization.

It also follows that a treaty should address the question of regional balances. While the focus is likely to be on Central Europe where the concentration of forces is greatest, provisions are required to redress disparities in the North and South. Limitations throughout the area of application are equally necessary in order to preclude the circumvention of these provisions by simply shifting forces from the centre to the flanks.

For Canada, the geographical factor has always been important. The Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on Security and Disarmament in 1982 noted that geographic and strategic asymmetries affect the types of forces deployed and the armaments which have to be taken into account in arms control and disarmament negotiations. It continued: "the two halves of the Atlantic Alliance are linked by an ocean and therefore heavily dependent on maritime forces, whereas the Warsaw Pact comprises a unified group of states in a single land mass. This affects the MBFR negotiations, for example, because of differences in reinforcement capabilities to

⁴⁸ Lothar Ruehl, MBFR: Lessons and Problems, Adelphi Papers 176, London: IISS, 1982, p. 3.

⁴⁹ "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988 paragraphs 1 and 15; Statement issued at the NATO Ministerial Meeting 8 December 1988, paragraph 4.

⁵⁰ "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988, paragraph 15.

the Central Front from rear areas in the Soviet Union or North America".⁵¹ The geographical factor will remain crucial to Canada, as it will to the other members of NATO.

OTHER SIMILARITIES

Apart from surprise attack and geostrategic positions, several other factors influencing objectives have changed little over the past twenty years. They include: the possibility of conflict by accident or miscalculation, the concept of stability, the question of long-term European security, the desirable level of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and the desirable level of US forces in Western Europe.

Conflict by Accident or Miscalculation

Like the risk of surprise attack, the possibility of conflict by accident or miscalculation has been a function of uncertainty about intentions and of lack of confidence. In the 1970s Canada foresaw such a possibility⁵² and argued for measures -- such as inspection and observation of military movements and manoeuvres -- as a means of reducing misunderstanding ensuing from military activities.⁵³ Thus, this factor was prominent in efforts to develop a CBM regime as part of the Helsinki Final Document and to negotiate associated measures as part of an agreement on MBFR. In the same way it was a factor in the Stockholm Talks on CSBMs. In Canada's view, the agreement reached "will reduce the risk of accidental war in Europe."⁵⁴ If concern about accidental war is less today, a major reason is the success in implementing the provisions of the Stockholm Document, particularly those on observation and inspection. Recent NATO statements, while not making direct reference to the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation, have called for measures on "greater openness and predictability about military activities" and on "improvements in the arrangements for observing military

⁵¹ Security and Disarmament, Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, 1982, p. 54.

⁵² Foreign Policy for Canadians, Europe, Ottawa, 1970, p. 24.

⁵³ Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 10, 5 April 1974, 18-19.

⁵⁴ Hansard, Ottawa, 4 December 1986, p. 1764.

activities".⁵⁵ If such measures are negotiated in the second stage of talks on CSBMs, one result will be a further reduction in the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation.

Concept of Stability

All of the factors so far raised -- the risk of and capability for surprise attack, the geostrategic positions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of conflict by accident or miscalculation -- bear on the perception of stability. The concept of stability is directly related to the balance of forces. It is also applied to measures which could form part of a treaty on conventional forces in Europe.

Stability is a dynamic concept, reflecting quantitative and qualitative shifts in the military confrontation. Thus, in addition to the balance of forces, stability is affected by technological development. In the absence of conflict there exists a degree of stability. Maintaining whatever degree of stability exists and enhancing it are common objectives of defence policy and of arms control and disarmament policy.⁵⁶ Thus the NATO declaration on MBFR in 1968 stated as one of the agreed principles that reductions "should not be such as to risk destabilizing the situation in Europe."⁵⁷ At the same time agreement on reductions was seen as a necessary step in reducing military confrontation and thereby enhancing military stability.⁵⁸

Stability has been a central concept in planning for the new negotiation, so much so that its unofficial title was "Conventional Stability Talks".⁵⁹ NATO wants to eliminate asymmetries "which are detrimental to Western security and which are a source of potential instability" and, in the process, arrive at a "stable balance of conventional

⁵⁵ Statement issued at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, 8 December 1988, paragraph 10.

⁵⁶ On the complexity of maintaining and enhancing stability see Andrew P. Rasiulis, "Conventional Arms Control: Stabilizing the Balance in Europe," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Winter 1988, p. 42.

⁵⁷ Communiqué of NATO Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik, 24-25 June 1968.

⁵⁸ At that time many statements used "stability" and "security" interchangeably.

⁵⁹ NATO countries' unofficial title for the talks.

forces at lower levels".⁶⁰ Specifically, the threat to stability has been identified as "the dominant presence in Europe of the conventional armed forces of the Soviet Union", and the Warsaw Pact superiority in "key conventional weapons systems" combined with the asymmetries which have been mentioned in the preceding chapter.⁶¹

The goal of stability, must be applied to all weapon systems in the aggregate. Stability would be enhanced through a balance in conventional forces, but nuclear weapons must also be addressed. Deterrence has been achieved through, and will continue to require, an adequate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, not least because "only the nuclear element can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk".⁶² In Prime Minister Mulroney's words, "neither Western Europe nor North America nor both together can maintain an effective and stable military balance between East and West by conventional means alone".⁶³

Stability means that there is a reduced likelihood of the outbreak of conflict or, if deterrence fails, that the conflict can be brought to an end with a minimum of violence. Stability can be achieved at a higher or lower level of forces. If achieved at a lower level, stability may, over a period of time, have beneficial effects beyond the prevention of war.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Brussels Declaration, 11 December 1985, paragraphs 1 and 6.

⁶¹ "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988, paragraphs 1 and 2.

⁶² *Ibid.*, paragraph 5.

⁶³ "Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's Statement on the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit," Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, 10 December 1987, p. 3.

⁶⁴ For a discussion of different kinds of stability see George Lindsey's testimony to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Issue No. 58, 17 February 1982, pp. 5-15; and Joachim Krause, Prospects for Conventional Arms Control in Europe, Occasional Papers Series No. 8, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York, 1988, pp. 9-10.

Long-term Security

Another goal of conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe is the development of a security regime which could replace the existing military confrontation. As in the past, negotiations will aim for long-term security.

Over the years, long-term security has had two components. One is a political order which could replace the current state of military confrontation. This would be a broad framework involving economic, humanitarian as well as political considerations. The second component is an institutional framework which would be required to implement the arms control and disarmament agreement. The latter would have an impact on the former.

Long-term security was important during the period leading up to the beginning of the MBFR talks because simultaneously the process of initiating the CSCE was taking place. The Harmel Report had underlined the importance of achieving "a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees".⁶⁵ Also, it was a time when some cooperation between East and West was envisaged in furthering détente in Europe. Canada saw the MBFR talks as part of the process "aimed at lowering tensions and increasing East-West cooperation particularly in Europe".⁶⁶ A Canadian objective was "to play an active and constructive role in the consolidation of peace in Europe and in current efforts to contribute to East-West détente".⁶⁷

⁶⁵ "The Future Tasks of the Alliance," Report to the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 13-14 December 1967. Achievement of a new political order has been one of the purposes of NATO since its inception in 1949.

⁶⁶ George K. Grande, "Statement at the Preparatory Consultation on MBFR," Department of External Affairs, Statement and Speeches No. 49, 15 May 1973.

⁶⁷ George K. Grande, "Statement by the Head of the Canadian Delegation," 30 October 1973.

During the first two years of the MBFR talks, "a road map for stable and constructive relations between East and West and for a dynamic evolution in Europe"⁶⁸ was being prepared in the negotiations leading to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.⁶⁹ Some thought was also being given to the question of an institutional framework. There was a desire both to ensure a continuing process and to avoid formal mechanisms which could inhibit further change.⁷⁰ For example, Canada saw merit in a suggestion for a standing commission on East-West problems but considered that "the time was probably not yet right for such a proposal".⁷¹

Such a commission might have been similar to a risk reduction centre, the establishment of which has been suggested in recent years. As part of an arms control and disarmament treaty on conventional forces, it would be used to deal with low-level incidents, and other subjects such as military doctrine.⁷²

In the MBFR talks, one of the associated measures proposed by the West was a body modelled on the Standing Consultative Commission. This had been established under the provisions of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, to deal with compliance issues.

In general, the need for formal institutional structures is greater in the case of a treaty presenting complex problems of verification, as would one on conventional forces in Europe.⁷³

⁶⁸ North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communiqué, 9 December 1988, paragraph 4.

⁶⁹ See Robert Spencer (ed.), Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Centre for International Studies, Toronto, 1984, Part I.

⁷⁰ CSCE has continued as a process without a permanent secretariat or other formal institutional structure. On institutionalization, see Pierre Hassner, "Gorbachev and the West," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, Autumn 1988, p. 102.

⁷¹ Hansard Vol. 8, Ottawa, 1970, p. 7823.

⁷² See for example Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe: Union of Concerned Scientists, Lexington, 1987, p. 217.

⁷³ The CSBM regime agreed at Stockholm is being successfully implemented without a formal institutional structure.

During planning for new negotiations, NATO statements have said little about the institutional framework that would be required as part of a treaty. But the scope of the negotiations and the emphasis on a "vigorous and reliable regime for monitoring and verification"⁷⁴ suggest that a treaty would involve institutional arrangements which would become a fundamental part of a broad security regime.

By contrast, the subject of a security regime has figured in planning for the new negotiation. It has been recognized that a treaty on conventional forces "would remove an obstacle to the achievement of the better political relationship between all states of Europe...."⁷⁵ There has also been a recognition that movement toward a better political relationship must, at each stage, be founded on the basis of "undiminished security" of all countries concerned.⁷⁶ Canada had spelled out this notion of mutual security some years earlier at the beginning of the MBFR talks: the primary objective was to lessen military confrontation by means of reductions and limitations, "in so far as this can be attained without diminishing the security of the states party to the negotiations."⁷⁷

Some important elements of a broad security regime were identified at the NATO Summit in 1988. "We look forward to a Europe undivided, in which people of all states can freely receive ideas and information; enjoy their fundamental human rights; and determine their own future... A just and lasting peaceful order in Europe requires that all states enjoy relations of confidence with their own citizens; trust them to make political or economic choices of their own; and allow them to receive information from and exchange ideas with citizens of other states".⁷⁸ The statement continued: "conven-

⁷⁴ Statement issued at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, 8 December 1988, paragraph 7.

⁷⁵ Ibid., paragraph 12.

⁷⁶ Brussels Declaration, 11 December 1986, paragraph 8. This point is also covered in the agreed mandate: "ensure that the security of each participant is not affected adversely at any stage."

⁷⁷ George K. Grande, Statement by the Head of the Canadian Delegation, 30 October 1973.

⁷⁸ "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988, paragraph 8.

tional arms control talks should be guided by a coherent political vision which reflects these values."⁷⁹

Achieving a security regime which would replace the current military confrontation would involve, among other things, a restructuring of forces on both sides to enhance defensive capabilities and to make possible a substantial readjustment in the force-to-space ratio,⁸⁰ without precluding a revised NATO forward defence strategy. The NATO statement of December 1988 envisaged such moves in a later stage of negotiations.⁸¹

Level of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe

The Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe continues to be the great unknown factor influencing arms control and disarmament in Europe. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe⁸² have far exceeded what the West considers acceptable for the purposes of defence. Throughout the past forty years, Soviet forces have been viewed, not only as a serious threat to the West, but also as an instrument for maintaining political control in Eastern Europe. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs has stated, "the capacity to use force, or to threaten the use of force within that area itself is a major reason for the current level of Soviet troops deployed there."⁸³

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, paragraph 9. The implications of ending the division of Europe the question of German reunification are beyond the scope of this paper.

⁸⁰ The force-to-space ratio refers to the size of forces required to hold a specific length of territory in the face of attack. Estimates have been in the range of a brigade for seven to fifteen kilometers of the line south from the Baltic where Warsaw Pact forces in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia face NATO forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. The level of residual forces on the front line after an agreement, a "critical minimum," must be a major concern for NATO countries. See Roger Hill Are Major Conventional Force Reductions in Europe Possible?: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Aurora Papers, Ottawa, 7, 1988, p. 28. See also the recent study by Barry Blechman, William J. Durch, and Kevin P. O'Prey, Regaining the High Ground: NATO's Stake in the New Talks on Conventional Forces in Europe: Defense Forecasts Inc., Washington, D. C., April 1989, chapter 6, pp. 3, 44-45.

⁸¹ Statement issued at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, 8 December 1988, paragraph 13.

⁸² The greatest concentration is in the German Democratic Republic. The two Warsaw Pact countries free of Soviet forces are Romania and Bulgaria.

⁸³ The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Standing Committee on National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 10, Ottawa, 28 April 1987, p. 7.

There is no reliable way of gauging the level of Soviet forces considered necessary for political control. As a result, it is difficult to determine how far the Soviet Union might be prepared to go in the negotiation of a treaty designed to reduce and limit armed forces in Europe. Experience in the MBFR talks suggested that the Soviet Union thought it had limited room for manoeuvre. While the number of Soviet troops has not changed much over the past fifteen years, equipment levels have increased dramatically.

The USSR recently announced unilateral force reductions.⁸⁴ Perhaps Soviet requirements for political control in Eastern Europe has declined somewhat. However, this reflects no more than a Soviet declaratory policy in favour of large reductions.⁸⁵ A treaty providing for large-scale withdrawals of Soviet forces and for post-reduction limitations on the size of forces might not be compatible with Soviet political objectives in Eastern Europe. Any estimate is made more difficult at the present time because of the uncertainty arising from the changes underway in some countries of Eastern Europe. Probing for an answer to this unknown will be important in the new negotiations.

Level of US Forces in Western Europe

The demands in the United States for a reduction in the level of US forces in Western Europe was a dominant factor during the planning for MBFR. The subject arose again in the past few years coinciding with planning for the new negotiation.

From 1966, Senator Mansfield led a move in the US Congress aimed at the withdrawal of approximately 150,000 US troops from Europe, or fifty percent of the total. The implications of such a unilateral reduction preoccupied the governments of NATO countries. The Western proposal for the MBFR talks became a way of countering demands for US troop reductions. Soviet reluctance to agree to the MBFR talks nearly resulted in the success of the Congressional action. The action stalled when, in the spring of 1971, the Soviet leaders finally announced support for the MBFR talks. It

⁸⁴ On unilateral reductions see p. 49 below.

⁸⁵ See, for example, Budapest Appeal, 11 June 1986.

became possible to hold out the possibility of negotiated, rather than unilateral, reductions.⁸⁶

As a result of the failure to reach a MBFR agreement, it was perhaps not surprising that the subject of unilateral reductions was raised again in the United States. Following the US Senate's freeze on the level of US forces in Europe in 1983, there were proposals for withdrawal of some US forces unless European members of NATO improved their conventional forces. The question of greater burden-sharing among NATO allies is unlikely to disappear, especially in view of the increasingly high costs of maintaining troops in Europe and the growing US need to cut defence expenditure. Nevertheless, the new negotiations will focus initially on reductions in armaments rather than troops. In order to achieve a long-term security regime, there must be a continuing strong North American commitment to the defence of Europe.

FACTORS SUBJECT TO CHANGE

Some factors influencing objectives have changed since the days of planning for MBFR. These include: the international politico-military situation, the level of confidence, on-site inspection, Soviet military doctrine, modernization of armaments, unilateral Soviet reductions, and public opinion.

International Politico-Military Situation

Three examples of change in the international politico-military situation are particularly relevant to the subject of conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe.

The late sixties and early seventies saw the signing of such important arms control agreements as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and SALT I, including the ABM Treaty. In the past few years, the emphasis has been on negotiating disarmament agreements, with arms reductions, not just limitations. The 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

⁸⁶ The number of US troops in Europe has varied over the years. For example, the level dropped during the later years of the Vietnam War. At the present time there are 216,000 US ground force troops located in Europe. See Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts, Government of Canada, News Release 241, Ottawa, 25 November 1988.

(INF) Treaty is the first nuclear disarmament accord. Negotiations are well advanced on a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement. The MBFR talks did not result in reducing the conventional forces in Central Europe. However, a rudimentary CBM regime was put in place in the mid-seventies and was greatly developed and expanded in the Stockholm talks on confidence- and security-building measures.

Military activities of the superpowers had an impact on the arms control environment. The US fought a war with North Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s; the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and fought against the Mujahadeen during the 1980s. The former occurred during the period of détente in East-West relations leading to SALT I and the beginning of CSCE and MBFR. The latter was a leading cause of the deterioration of East-West relations at the beginning of the 1980s. However, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan contributed to the improvement of relations as the decade ended.

In the Middle East, the October War of 1973 almost coincided with the beginning of the MBFR talks. Today, as the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe begins, serious moves are being made to convene an international conference on the Middle East. This change could be potentially very important because improved relations in the Middle East may contribute to a better atmosphere for conventional arms control talks in Europe.

Also noteworthy is the change in the attitude of France. France was the only major European state that refused to participate in the MBFR talks. However, at the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, the French proposed a conference on disarmament in Europe. This demonstrated France's interest in pursuing less formal, bloc-to-bloc talks applying to a larger area, including a substantial part of the USSR. France was an active participant in planning for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

All the changes described above, put together with the more open and forthcoming stance of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, augur well for negotiations on limiting and reducing conventional forces in Europe.

Level of Confidence

There have been, in recent years, more frequent contacts between East and West, including the four US/USSR summits, and bilateral and multilateral negotiations, such as MBFR. In Canada's case, an expansion of bilateral relations with Eastern European countries was envisaged in the 1970 foreign policy white paper,⁸⁷ but not until the past five years have bilateral consultations on arms control and disarmament been held with members of the Warsaw Pact. Bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union may soon be expanded to include military staff talks.⁸⁸

The 1970 white paper noted the link between the degree of East-West confidence and progress in arms control and disarmament.⁸⁹ The link was underlined again in the government's 1986 publication, Canada's International Relations.⁹⁰ In Canada's acceptance of the Final Document of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting, which concluded in Vienna in January 1989, the Secretary of State for External Affairs referred to "an improving climate of confidence in East-West relations."⁹¹

During the past twenty years, the level of confidence between East and West has fluctuated. From a low in the early 1980s, it has now risen to a level higher than that which existed in the early seventies. This increased confidence can facilitate the negotiation of an agreement on conventional arms control and disarmament. An agreement, in turn, could have the effect of a further increase in confidence.

⁸⁷ Foreign Policy for Canadians, Europe, p. 23.

⁸⁸ Department of National Defence News Release, 4/89, Ottawa, 27 January, 1989, p. 2.

⁸⁹ Foreign Policy for Canadians, Europe, p. 24.

⁹⁰ Canada's International Relations, Response of the Government to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons, December 1986, p. 13.

⁹¹ Department of External Affairs, News Release, No. 008, Ottawa, 16 January, 1989.

On-Site Inspection

A major contribution to building confidence has been Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection as one of several methods of verification. There had been a long-standing refusal to consider on-site inspection. However, in 1983, the Warsaw Pact accepted the principle of on-site inspection in the MBFR reductions area in Central Europe. In the absence of an agreement, that acceptance was never put to the test. In early 1986, the Soviet Union went further; they agreed to permanently manned exit-entry points for the MBFR reductions area.

Later that year, the Soviet Union agreed to inspections as a method of verifying compliance with CSBMs negotiated at Stockholm. The Stockholm Document states that "...each participating state has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs."⁹² The zone extended from the Atlantic to the Urals. Thus, the Soviet Union had agreed, for the first time, to on-site inspections of military activities in a substantial portion of Soviet territory. That same part of the Soviet Union is included in the mandate for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The most important milestone in Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection was the INF Treaty. It provided for verification by on-site inspection of "the number of missiles" and of "the process of elimination."⁹³ Provision was made for inspections over a period of thirteen years. For the first time a treaty contained detailed provisions for on-site inspection, not only in the Soviet Union and the United States but also at US sites in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and at Soviet sites in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. The INF Treaty set a precedent for implementing this method of verification which NATO countries have long insisted would be a necessary part of a treaty on limiting and reducing conventional forces in Europe. The agreed mandate for the new negotiation

⁹² Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 19 September 1986, paragraph 65.

⁹³ Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Article XI.

states that "an effective and strict verification regime...will include on-site inspection as a matter of right."

On-site inspection, in addition to being a means of monitoring compliance with a treaty would also be an effective method of detecting mobilization of personnel and equipment sufficiently early to allow time to respond.⁹⁴

While on-site inspection is not the only method of verification which would figure in the provisions of a treaty on conventional forces, its acceptance by the Soviet Union means that an effective verification regime is now possible.

Soviet Military Doctrine

The nature of Soviet military doctrine is an important factor influencing objectives in conventional arms control and disarmament. Like NATO military doctrine, it has been subject to change over the years. In both cases doctrine deals with nuclear and conventional forces. The term has tended to be used differently by the East and West with the result that meaningful discussion of doctrine has been difficult, if not impossible.

When the Soviet Union refers to military doctrine it usually does so in broad political terms which equate more closely to security policy. However, operational plans, encompassing organizational arrangements and force posture, is closer to what is meant by military doctrine in the West. The Soviet Union has repeatedly insisted that its military doctrine is defensive. However, its operations, judging by equipment, training and force structure, have remained offensive. Soviet operations lead to Western concerns about surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ John R. Galvin, "The NATO Alliance: A Framework for Security," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 1989, 88. On mobilization see above p. 26.

⁹⁵ For a recent analysis of Soviet military doctrine, see Edward C. Warner III, "New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defence Policy," Survival, Vol XXXI, No. 1, January/February 1989, pp. 13-33.

Among the proposals on conventional arms control and disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, was a call for consultations on force postures between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The aim would be to compare military doctrines and ensure that those of both sides were based on defensive principles.⁹⁶ The Warsaw Pact suggested that consultations take place in Brussels, in Warsaw, or in each alternately.

In December 1988, NATO countries agreed, in principle, to "an organized exchange of views on military doctrine tied to actual force structure, capabilities and dispositions in Europe."⁹⁷ It appeared that a proposal would be made in the context of the further round of negotiations on confidence and security-building measures.⁹⁸ Whether in that forum or at a conference organized for that purpose, it seems that some kind of dialogue on doctrine among military experts will take place.⁹⁹

Short-term prospects for such a discussion may be better as a result of the recent announcement that Soviet divisions remaining in Eastern Europe after unilateral reductions would be restructured and become "strictly defensive."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ For example, Budapest Appeal, 11 June 1986; and Warsaw Pact statement on military doctrine, Berlin, 30 May 1987.

⁹⁷ Statement issued at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, 8 December 1988, paragraph 11. Military doctrine is not mentioned in the mandate for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

⁹⁸ For such a proposal see John Toogood, Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Western Opening Positions, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Working Paper 15, December 1988, p. 33.

⁹⁹ A seminar was announced for 21-24 June 1989, on the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland.

¹⁰⁰ Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at the UN General Assembly, News Release No. 97, USSR Embassy, Ottawa, 8 December 1988, p. 21.

Restructuring of Warsaw Pact forces, as well as of NATO forces, will be an essential part of any longer-term transition to a security regime replacing the existing military confrontation.¹⁰¹ There could be value in an ongoing dialogue on military doctrine.

Modernization of Armaments

Change in doctrine may be linked to modernization of armaments, and modernization has become a more important factor influencing objectives in conventional arm control and disarmament.

Modernization is an ongoing function of defence policy and planning, not only because a weapon has a limited lifespan, but also because technological change may make possible the development of new systems. In the past twenty years, the development of modern anti-tank systems has been a particularly dramatic example.

New technologies have led to major changes in such areas as command and control systems, the accuracy of weapons, the ability to increase and concentrate firepower and the capability for deep strikes using conventional weapons. Precision-guided munitions have brought benefits to the defence. If available in sufficient numbers, they may allow for a decrease in the forces necessary to hold a defensive line. They may, therefore, influence the force-to-space ratio, one of the major constraints on proposals by NATO countries for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.¹⁰²

Modernization may also provide an incentive for the Soviet Union to seek a conventional arms control and disarmament agreement. To the extent that the likely development and deployment of certain weapon systems are of concern to the Soviet

¹⁰¹ See above pp. 34-36.

¹⁰² John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983, pp. 191-192.

Union,¹⁰³ modernization programmes may provide NATO countries with a degree of leverage in negotiations,¹⁰⁴ even though the original reason for modernization was to improve defence capabilities thereby strengthening deterrence.

The cost of modernization has grown steadily, particularly during the 1980s, at a time when competing demands for government funds have increased. A treaty on conventional forces introducing ceilings on certain weapon systems could permit a more selective approach to modernization of armaments which in turn could result in an overall lowering of military expenditure.

Unilateral Soviet Reductions

Announcements of unilateral reductions have often been seen as mere gestures, with little influence on arms control negotiations. In the mid-1950s, Soviet leaders advised Canada of their plan for a dramatic reduction of Soviet armed forces. Prime Minister St. Laurent replied that Canadian satisfaction was tempered by the reflection that the reductions would have been more timely ten years earlier. Furthermore, the reductions would still leave the USSR stronger in Europe than the Western European countries. He pointed out that:

"If reductions were to contribute to international confidence they would have to be part of an agreement providing machinery to assure all signatories that the reductions were in fact being carried out and providing also for an adequate system for warning of preparations for surprise attack."¹⁰⁵

What is withdrawn unilaterally can be replaced, especially when there is no way of verifying that announced reductions actually take place. Cynicism developed when, for example, in 1979 the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of a tank division from the German Democratic Republic. There was, in fact, an increase in Soviet forces in the region through restructuring of the remaining divisions.

¹⁰³ Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces," International Security, Spring 1988, p. 57.

¹⁰⁴ Paul Nitze, "Security and Arms Control -- A Number of Good Beginnings," NATO Review, Vol. 36, No. 6, December 1988, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ Canada and the United Nations, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1957, p. 6.

By contrast, the unilateral reductions announced by Mr. Gorbachev at the United Nations in December 1988 have been widely welcomed as a factor which could have a positive influence on the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.¹⁰⁶ Among the reasons for this different response was the fact that announced reductions, involving in some cases disbandment of units, were directly related to NATO concerns. In particular, the reductions lessened the Soviet capability for surprise attack, and were therefore seen as militarily significant.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the announced reductions, when effected over a two-year period, would reduce certain asymmetries which have likely to be the initial focus of the new negotiations.¹⁰⁸ By unilaterally narrowing the disparity in tanks and artillery, the Soviet Union would facilitate the negotiation of a treaty providing for asymmetrical reductions and post-reduction ceilings. Much will depend on how these unilateral reductions are carried out: How much accurate data is provided? Are attempts made to resolve ambiguities and disagreements? What arrangements are made for observing the withdrawal of forces, the disbanding of units, and the destruction of weapons?

Public Opinion

Some of the above-mentioned changes can have an effect on public opinion in Western countries. Two examples are on-site inspection and unilateral reductions. Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection should make it easier for governments to explain the necessity for an effective verification regime including its intrusive character and its cost. Unilateral reductions, on the other hand, can too easily be interpreted by the public to mean an improvement in the situation. However, this interpretation may be either premature or unwarranted. Arms control and disarmament talks may be made more

¹⁰⁶ For analysis of the unilateral reductions announced by Mr. Gorbachev, see John Barrett, "An Assessment of Gorbachev's Unilateral Reduction in Armed Forces," Arms Control Communiqué, No 57, December 1988; Phillip A. Karber, "The Military Impact of the Gorbachev Reductions," Armed Forces Journal International, January 1989, pp. 54-64; and Jack Mendelsohn, "Gorbachev's Pre-emptive Concession," Arms Control Today, March 1989, pp. 10-15.

¹⁰⁷ This was reinforced by a subsequent announcement that four of the six tank divisions would be withdrawn from the central part of the German Democratic Republic. See "Soviets Limiting Quick-Strike Ability," New York Times, 26 January 1989.

¹⁰⁸ See Statement of NATO Ministerial Meeting, 8 December 1988, paragraph 5.

difficult if the maintenance of military strength during the negotiations is called into question by an overly optimistic public.

Apart from such considerations, public opinion as a factor influencing objectives has changed. During the planning for MBFR, and for most of the fifteen years of the talks, public attention was focused on nuclear arms control and disarmament. Negotiations on strategic nuclear forces and on intermediate-range nuclear forces made headlines in a way that those on conventional arms control and disarmament did not. With the INF Treaty in force and considerable progress made towards a START treaty, there may be greater public attention on the conventional forces talks. There is now greater public pressure on the governments of NATO countries to work towards the reduction of the military confrontation. In some countries, support for large defence expenditures has eroded. Competition for available public funds is greater than it was twenty years ago. In addition to economic pressures, demographic change, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, which makes a major contribution to the defence of Europe, is a strong incentive to negotiate a reduction in conventional forces.

There is, therefore, the possibility of much more widespread public awareness of and support for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe than there had been for MBFR. Public presentation will become a more important part of the process. Public support can promote a successful outcome of the talks, particularly if that support includes no demands for premature adjustment of force structuring and modernization plans;¹⁰⁹ and an understanding that the negotiations on conventional forces concern the political future of Europe.¹¹⁰ Both presuppose an appreciation of the complexities and an understanding of the objectives being pursued in the negotiations.

¹⁰⁹ Paul Nitze, "Security and Arms Control -- A Number of Good Beginnings," NATO Review, Vol 36, No 6, December 1988, p. 3.

¹¹⁰ Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, eds., Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 9.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion, the first conclusion is that Canadian politico-military objectives in negotiations on conventional forces have not changed over the past twenty years. Like those of other western allies they are: to reduce military confrontation; and to maintain and enhance stability at lower levels of forces.¹¹¹ Whereas in MBFR, the attempt was made to realize these objectives primarily through reductions in manpower, today it is through reductions focusing mainly on armaments. The asymmetries involved are greater. Though the geographic area of application is larger today, Central Europe remains the key region, particularly for an initial agreement.

A major difference between 1973 and 1989 is that within these general objectives there is a more precise formulation for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe than there was for MBFR. Both in the mandate and in NATO statements, the focus of negotiations is spelled out: to eliminate the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

A second conclusion is that an initial treaty should be just that: a first step to be followed by the negotiation of further agreements which would include not only further reduction of the military confrontation, but the means of transition to a regime replacing the existing confrontation. The objective is to ensure that treaties on conventional forces in Europe contribute to the achievement of long-term security.

It will, therefore, remain important to assist, through the talks on conventional forces, in the management of East-West relations, but not in the sense in which the term has sometimes been perceived in the past, of retention of military confrontation. "Managing" in the period ahead should involve the more challenging tasks of designing an institutional framework for the implementation of agreements and of devising complex transitional arrangements including restructuring of forces. These could permit a safe evolution to, in the words of the Harmel Report, "a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees."

¹¹¹ Throughout this chapter objectives are underlined for ease of reference.

Under this step-by-step negotiating process, it also remains important, as stated in the mandate, to ensure that the security of each participant is not affected adversely at any stage. For NATO countries -- in particular its two north American members -- the realization of this objective would involve measures which allow for the maintenance of the North American commitment to the security of Europe. An agreement on reduction of forces involving withdrawals of stationed forces in the Federal Republic of Germany could provide for secure storage of equipment and supplies in Europe among other measures to facilitate reinforcement from North America in time of crisis as well as periodic military exercises.

In an initial treaty as well as in subsequent agreements, verification provisions and their implementation may be more detailed than in any previous arms control and disarmament treaties. The objective is to contribute to the development of an effective verification regime. This means both the technical and the political aspects: the methods and the institutional framework. Through the implementation of this objective the level of confidence between East and West can be facilitated. Such progress can, in turn, improve prospects for the next step.

Another objective is to use the experience gained during the past fifteen years of negotiations on conventional arms. Specifically the objective is to build upon areas of agreement and other experience in MBFR.¹¹² "Much of what has been learned from the successes and failures during the many years of these talks will prove useful in the new negotiations."¹¹³

These Canadian objectives are shared by other NATO countries. They are objectives which take account of the importance Canada has attached over time to conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe and which are worthy of vigorous pursuit in concert with Canada's allies.

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¹¹² See Phillip Karber's list of areas of agreement in MBFR in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, eds., Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 160.

¹¹³ The Right Honourable Joe Clark, "Statement on the Conclusion of CSCE Follow-up Meeting", Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 89/03, 19 January 1989, p. 2.

The above-mentioned objectives are related to the general aim of contributing to international security, the primary reason for Canada and other NATO countries pursuing negotiations on conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe.

The other general objective mentioned in the Introduction, the reduction of military expenditure, is of most importance to those countries with the largest military budgets. It can be argued that an initial agreement which provided for asymmetrical reductions of tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers would enable only one country to effect substantial reductions in military expenditure: the Soviet Union. Parity in those weapon systems at a level approximately ten percent below current NATO holdings would not result in significant savings in manpower or in modernization of armaments for NATO countries. Subsequent agreements providing for further reductions in conventional forces could result in substantial cuts in expenditures for those NATO countries contributing the most troops and weapons to the defence of Europe, depending on the extent to which reductions in forces led to smaller armed forces. Against such savings would need to be set the substantial costs of implementing the verification provisions of the agreements and costs associated with the necessary restructuring of forces.

Reduction in the size of Canadian forces in Europe would be unlikely to generate substantial short-term savings. Troops would probably be redeployed in Canada or in peacekeeping duties abroad. Over the longer term, however, reductions in military expenditure could be realized because of a reduced requirement for modernization of armaments, especially such weapons as tanks which are not required in Canada. In June 1988, the Minister of National Defence put it this way:

"If, for example, a conventional balance were reached in Europe at much lower levels of armaments and a decision was made that we could begin to repatriate troops from Europe as a result of the negotiation -- which is not imminent-- it would certainly affect the assumptions in the White Paper and the sort of procurement that we would be doing."¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ The Honourable Perrin Beatty, Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, Issue 25, Ottawa, 21 June 1988, p. 45.

There would be continuing costs associated with an arrangement for secure storage of equipment in Europe.¹¹⁵

Though agreements on conventional forces would be unlikely to enable Canada to save a significant proportion of the cost of maintaining forces in Europe, which was over one billion dollars in Financial Year 1988/89, reductions in military expenditure by some other Western countries made possible by arms control and disarmament agreement could benefit Canada indirectly particularly if the United States was able to cut its military expenditure.

* * * * *

On the assumption that public attention to negotiations on conventional forces in Europe will be greater than in the past and that the need for public support throughout the negotiating process will also increase, the foregoing discussion of factors suggests an objective of a different order: to present publicly and effectively the politico-military objectives, the links between defence and arms control and disarmament policy, the interrelationship between the conventional and nuclear balance of forces, the Western approach to limiting and reducing conventional forces and the positive way in which the Soviet Union has been responding to that approach. To a considerable extent, the optimism about the prospects for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is a direct result of the Soviet Union embracing Western positions on such subjects as asymmetrical reductions and verification.

In order to realize this objective, it will be necessary for a public presentation programme to emphasize the longer-term goal of replacing the existing military confrontation through, for example, the elaboration of the elements of a different security regime. It will also be necessary to explain the way in which arms control and disarmament negotiations can contribute towards reaching that goal through a step-by-step approach.

¹¹⁵ See above p. 53.

Effective public presentation will be especially important in Canada because it is geographically remote from the area of application. The Canadian presence in Europe is also much more limited than that of the United States. Thus it impinges less on the Canadian public consciousness.

In Canada, a public presentation programme would be grounded in the continuing strong public support for NATO and for arms control and disarmament, and in the recognition that "the commitment of North American democracies is vital to Europe's security" and "a free independent and increasingly more united Europe is vital to the security of North America."¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Platform on European Security Interests, Western European Union, The Hague, 27 October 1987, reproduced in Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons, 11 May 1988.

APPENDIX A

Selective Chronology

1954

USSR call for a European security conference

1955-1957

Proposals on surprise attack in UN Disarmament
Sub Committee

1958

November Surprise Attack Conference of Experts in
Geneva

1966

July US Senator Mansfield's call for reduction of
US troops in Europe.December NATO Ministerial Communiqué on gradual and
balanced revision of force levels

1967

December Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the
Alliance

1968

June Reykjavik NATO Ministerial on MBFR principles

1970

June Warsaw Pact agreement that Canada and the
United States could participate in an European
security conference

1971	
March	Brezhnev's willingness to negotiate on conventional force reductions
1972	
May	SALT I
November	CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks in Helsinki
1973	
January	MBFR Exploratory Talks in Vienna
July	Beginning of CSCE (NATO and NNA press for CBMs from Atlantic to Urals)
October	Beginning of MBFR
1975	
August	CSCE Summit in Helsinki
1978	
May	At UNSSOD I French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe (CDE) within the framework of CSCE
	Warsaw Pact acceptance of principle of asymmetrical reduction to common ceilings in MBFR
1979	
June	SALT II
October	Brezhnev speech in East Berlin on withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet troops and 1000 tanks from the German Democratic Republic
December	NATO two-track decision on INF
December	NATO proposal on Associated Measures in MBFR

1981

February Brezhnev acceptance in principle of extension of geographic area of CDE to Urals

1983

June Principle of on-site inspection in MBFR reductions area accepted by Warsaw Pact

1984

January Beginning of CSEM negotiations in Stockholm

1985

March Resumption of US/USSR negotiations in Geneva

November US/USSR summit in Geneva

1986

January Gorbachev speech agreeing to permanently manned exit-entry points for MBFR reductions area

April Gorbachev speech in East Berlin on reductions of conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals

May Halifax NATO Ministerial on establishment of High Level Task Force on conventional arms control

June Budapest Appeal

September Stockholm Document agreed

October US/USSR summit in Reykjavik

December Brussels Declaration on conventional arms control

1987

February Beginning of Conventional Mandate Talks (CMT)

April Gorbachev speech in Prague acknowledging asymmetry in armed forces of the two sides

June Reykjavik NATO Ministerial on autonomy of conventional stability talks within the framework of the CSCE

June CMT: Warsaw Pact draft mandate tabled

July CMT: NATO draft mandate tabled

December US/USSR summit in Washington and signing of INF treaty

1988

March NATO summit statement on conventional arms control

July Gorbachev's speech in Warsaw

July Warsaw Pact statement on talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe

December Gorbachev's speech at UN on unilateral reductions

December NATO Ministerial statement on conventional arms control

1989

January Agreement on mandate for conventional stability talks to be known as Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

February Ending of MBFR talks

March Opening of Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and of second stage of talks on CSEMs

APPENDIX B

MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL
ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE*

The representatives of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America held consultations in Vienna from 17 February 1987 to 10 January 1989.

These States,

Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in Europe;

Acknowledging that it is their armed forces which bear most immediately on the essential security relationship in Europe, in particular as they are signatories of the Treaties of Brussels (1948), Washington (1949) or Warsaw (1955), and accordingly are members of the North Atlantic Alliance or parties to the Warsaw Treaty;

Recalling that they are all participants in the CSCE process;

Recalling that, as reaffirmed in the Helsinki Final Act, they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance;

* Conventional Armed Forces include conventional armaments and equipment.

Determined that a Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe should take place in the framework of the CSCE process; reaffirming also that they participate in negotiations as sovereign and independent States and on the basis of full equality;

Have agreed on the following provisions:

Participants

The participants in this negotiation shall be the 23 above-listed States hereinafter referred to as "the participants".

Objectives and Methods

The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. Each and every participant undertakes to contribute to the attainment of these objectives.

These objectives shall be achieved by the application of militarily significant measures such as reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions, equal ceilings, and related measures, among others.

In order to achieve the above objectives, measures should be pursued for the whole area of application with provisions, if and where appropriate, for regional differentiation to redress disparities within the area of application and in a way which precludes circumvention.

The process of strengthening stability and security should proceed step-by-step, in a manner which will ensure that the security of each participant is not affected adversely at any stage.

Scope and Area of Application

The subject of the negotiation shall be the conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, of a participants based on land within the territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The existence of multiple capabilities will not be a criterion for modifying the scope of the negotiation:

- no conventional armaments or equipment will be excluded from the subject of the negotiation because they may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones. Such armaments or equipment will not be singled out in a separate category;
- Nuclear weapons will not be a subject of this negotiation.

Particular emphasis will initially be placed on those forces directly related to the achievement of the objectives of the negotiation set out above.

Naval forces and chemical weapons will not be addressed.

The area of application* shall be the entire land territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, which includes all the European island territories of the participants. In the case of the Soviet Union the area of application includes all the territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of Turkey the area of application includes the territory of Turkey north and west of the following line: the point of intersection of the border with the 39th parallel, Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gözne and Thence to the sea.

Exchange of Information and Verification

Compliance with the provisions of any agreement shall be verified through an effective and strict verification regime which, among other things, will include on-site inspections as a matter of right and exchanges of information.

Information shall be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to allow a meaningful comparison of the capabilities of the forces involved. Information shall also be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to provide a basis for the verification of compliance. The specific modalities for verification and the exchange of information including the degree of detail of the information and the order of its exchange, shall be agreed at the negotiation proper.

* The participants will be guided by the language on non-circumvention as set out in the section on Objectives and Methods.

Procedures and Other Arrangements

The procedures for the negotiation, including the agenda, work programme and timetable, working methods, financial issues and other organizational modalities, as agreed by the participants themselves, are out in Annex 1 of this mandate. They can be changed only by consensus of the participants.

The participants decided to take part in meetings of the States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act to be held at least twice during each round of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in order to exchange views and substantive information concerning the course of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Detailed modalities for these meetings are contained in Annex 2 to this mandate.

The participants will take into consideration the views expressed in such meetings by other CSCE participating States concerning their own security.

Participants will also provide information bilaterally.

The participants undertake to inform the next CSCE Follow-up Meeting of their work and possible results and to exchange views, at that meeting, with the other CSCE participating States on progress achieved in the negotiation.

The participants foresee that, in the light of circumstances at the time they will provide in their timetable for a temporary suspension to permit this exchange of views. The appropriate time and duration of this suspension is their sole responsibility.

Any modification of this mandate is the sole responsibility of the participants, whether they modify it themselves or concur in its modification at a future CSCE Follow-up Meeting.

The results of the negotiation will be determined only by the participants.

Character of Agreements

Agreements reached shall be internationally binding. Modalities for their entry into force will be decided at the negotiation.

Venue

The negotiation shall commence in Vienna no later than in the seventh week following the closure of the Vienna CSCE Meeting.

The representatives of the 23 participants, whose initials appear below, have concluded the foregoing mandate, which is equally authentic in the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish languages.

The representatives, recalling the commitment of their States to the achievement of a balanced outcome at the Vienna CSCE Meeting, have decided to transmit it to that Meeting with the recommendation that it be attached to its Concluding Document.